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We consider a seller who can sell her product over two periods, advance and spot. The seller has private
information about the product quality, which is unknown to customers in advance and publicly revealed in
spot. The question we consider is whether the seller has an incentive to signal quality in advance and, if so,
how she can convey a credible signal of product quality.
We characterize the seller’s signaling strategy and find that rationing of capacity in the advance period
is an effective tool of signaling product quality. We find that the high-quality seller can distinguish herself
by allocating less capacity than the low-quality seller in the advance period. We show that this signaling
mechanism exists whenever advance selling would be optimal for both the high-quality and low-quality sellers
if quality information was symmetric. We compare capacity rationing with other signaling tools, such as
pricing and advertising, and show that capacity rationing is the preferred one.
Despite its capability of conveying quality information more efficiently than other tools, capacity rationing
may still be very costly for the seller. When compared to the case when rationing was not allowed, the seller’s
ability to ration (rationing flexibility) sometimes makes the seller worse off, independently of her quality.
1. Introduction
Advance selling is used by service industries, including travel and entertainment, as well as in many
retail areas, including toys, books, electronics, and media products. With advance selling, sellers offer
customers an opportunity to purchase a product or service prior to the consumption time. This can
benefit the seller as advance selling may increase total sales and profit. It can benefit the customers,
too. Through buying in advance, customers can usually get guaranteed availability at discounted
prices. However, because consumers buy the product before it is available, they are often uncertain
about the quality of the product and their own value of the product at the time of consumption.
Consider advance selling of French wine, a practice known as en primeur (“wine futures” in French),
which has been practiced by chateaus in Bordeaux for centuries as well as wine makers in other areas
including Burgundy, Tuscany, and Rioja. Typically, six to twelve months after previous year’s grape
harvest, chateaus and vineyards offer customers opportunities to buy the new vintage. At the time
of the primeur sales, the wine is not yet “finished” and still in barrels. It is a practice of advance
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selling, as the payment is due at the time of en primeur, but the delivery occurs after the wine is
finished and bottled, usually twelve to eighteen months after the en primeur sales. Wineries may sell
all or just a portion of their wines through the en primeur system and both wineries and negociants
usually reserve some wine for later sales (2011 Bordeaux Futures Special Report1). Similar practices
are offered by online and brick-and-mortar wine sellers in retail setting.
Wine quality is uncertain to buyers when the wines are sold during en primeur. Like many other
experience goods (Su, 2009; Shulman et al., 2009), wines can truly be evaluated through the tasting
of the actual products, which are unavailable during the advance sales. Even though tasting of young
wines is sometimes offered and some information about the wine – such as the condition of harvested
grapes, the total cases made, and how many cases are available for the en primeur sales - is available,
the wines are six-month old, tannic, and still in the stage of malolactic fermentation. They often smell
and taste quite unpleasantly and are vastly different from what they will be in one year or so when
the production process is complete. Also, most wines are blends, while the en primeur samples can
be either unblended or differently blended. In fact, Jancis Robinson, a notable wine expert, cites wine
producers saying that “...none of the samples of 2000 being shown this week will be exactly the same
blend as the final wine (a common complaint about these en primeur tastings of wines more than a
year before final bottling)” (Robinson, 2001).
In contrast, chateaus, as the producers of the wines, have much more information about the grapes
used for wine as well as the entire wine-making processes. For example, they have first-hand infor-
mation on all of the important determinants of wine quality, such as climate, soil, viticultural and
enological practices (Jackson, 2000). Furthermore, they know how representative the sample barrels
are in terms of blending and overall quality. Consequently, the information on wine quality is asym-
metric in advance (Hadj Ali and Nanges, 2006; Dubois and Nauges, 2006).
Such information asymmetry is difficult to resolve via information sharing or contracts. The seller
(winery or chateau) has private information about what has happened so far to the wine, but with
many factors (climate, soil, viticultural practices, etc.) playing a role, no single attribute can precisely
determine the quality of wine. Thus, even if the seller is willing to share the information with the
consumers during the advance sales (e.g., by showing the soil samples from the vineyards2), it is
hard for consumers to integrate individual pieces of information to correctly predict the quality.
Furthermore, it is also hard to verify the information (e.g., if the grapes used to make the wine indeed
grew in the fields from where the soil samples were taken). Equally importantly, the wine-making
process continues after the en primeur sales, and the final quality will be affected by the seller’s
various post-fermentation treatments, such as adjustments (to acidity, flavor, color, etc.), blending,
1 http://www.jjbuckley.com/images/2011 BORDEAUX REPORT.pdf
2 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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stabilization, clarification, and bottling (Jackson, 2008). For blending alone, many wine-makers “may
add to a blend up to 15 percent of wine from a vintage other than that cited on the label,” a practice
known as “inter-vintage blending” (Robinson, 2011). Many of the above steps will depend on available
alternatives (e.g., which barrels to be mixed with), while others actually constitute some of the “trade
secrets” of the wineries. It is not surprising that wineries do not post this type of information and
would not want to contractually commit to it.
The information asymmetry about wine quality is gradually reduced over time and eventually
resolved after the wines are bottled and released to the market. Customers can evaluate the quality
of the finished wines by reading experts’ wine reviews,3 attending wine tasting events (e.g., Auffrey,
2008), ordering trial packs from online retailers (e.g.,theorganicwinecompany.com4), and tasting wines
at social events by chance.
Event ticket is another example where the seller has significantly more information than the buyers
about the products sold in advance. The advance ticket sales of the Ultra Music Festival in Miami,
FL (a festival for electro music featuring some of the top DJs in the world) and the Bonnaroo Music
Festival in Manchester, TN, both take place many months before the complete line-up and schedule are
announced.5 In fact, the advance sales of the 2014 Ultra Music Festival (www.ultramusicfestival.com)
have begun without any announced line-up. Although the seller has private information about DJs
headlining the festival, the complete line-up and schedules were announced after all advance tickets
were sold.6 Similar situations with asymmetric quality information include advance sales of new music
albums, games, and electronics before their official release.
When advance selling is offered, the sellers can choose to sell either all or a portion of the products.
We observe both practices. For example, some premier designer handbags (so called “it” bags in
Kuksov and Wang, 2011) are sold out during pre-order and will never arrive to the store.7 On the
other hand, in the en primeur market, chateaus release a proportion, ranging from twenty percent to
ninety percent, of their total production, thus intentionally limiting the wine availability in advance
market. According to the New York Times (Prial, 1989), the price-setting Bordeaux chateaus sell their
wines in stages, or “tranches.” In the first stage, they usually release about 20 percent of their total
production at the opening price. This rationing policy is well described by many wine-merchants and
wine-experts, see Decanter article8 and a newsletter from rarewineco.com.9 For the 2013 Burning Man
3 Reviews about the en primeur wines are not as reliable as the reports written after official release, largely due to
uncertainties of wines in early stage.
4 http://store.theorganicwinecompany.com/bordeaux-sampler-p47.aspx
5 The advance tickets for the 2014 Ultra Music Festival (March 28-30, 2014) are already sold out in May 2013.
http://www.ultramusicfestival.com/news
6 One of the authors is an avid follower of electro dance music and actively follows the trend and events.
7 http://www.fashionrules.com/2011/06/prada-fall-bags-and-shoes-to-pre-order/
8 http://www.decanter.com/wine-learning/wine-advice/basics/495393/how-to-buy-en-primeur
9 http://www.rarewineco.com/downloads/newsletter/archive/may801.pdf
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Festival, exactly 3,000 tickets out of 58,000 tickets were allocated for the advance holiday sales that
took place in December 20, 2012.10 Limiting pre-orders of new products is also a common practice
in electronic-device industries. Two best-known examples are Microsoft’s Xbox 360, released in 2005
(Harford, 2005) and Sony PlayStation 3, released in 2006 (Sinclair, 2006). In both cases, retailers such
as Gamestop accepted limited orders or limited the number of units that one consumer could order.
There are a number of reasons that can explain the sellers’ practice of rationing capacity. Limiting
the advance sales may create a hype and increase demand for new products (Retailing Today 2000;
Dye 2000; Brown 2001) or it could be simply the reflection of capacity shortage. In this paper, we
show that another reason for the seller’s rationing is to signal product quality.
Offering advance sales when the asymmetry in quality information exists can work for or against
the sellers. On one hand, it is possible for sellers of low-quality products to hide the inferior quality in
advance and to boost their sales by locking many customers who would not have made the purchase
if quality were known. On the other hand, the sellers who are unable to prove their quality, may need
to give a considerable price discount to induce customers to buy early, as customers always have an
option to delay purchase until quality is fully revealed. Given these two opposite drivers, it is not
clear whether and when the seller should offer advance selling, and if so, whether it is possible to
convey some of the information about the product quality to buyers through the terms of advance
selling (such as price or limited quantities offered for sale). Some key questions we like to address are
as follows. How does asymmetric quality information affect seller’s profit, and how much can sellers
gain from offering advance selling? Can the seller of high-quality products credibly signal her quality?
When is it beneficial to engage in actions that signal the quality level and, if so, which signals will
be most effective? We study these questions in this paper and, in particular, we examine the role of
capacity rationing as a signal of quality. We show that capacity rationing (i.e., limiting supply in the
advance period and choosing to satisfy a portion of advance demand) can be an efficient way to convey
the information about the product quality when compared to signaling through an advertisement. We
show that as long as both types of sellers would offer advance selling when the quality information
was symmetric, there exists an equilibrium in which the seller of high-quality products allocates less
capacity in advance than the seller of low-quality products to distinguish herself (signal her type).
Literature Review
Our work is closely related to the literature on signaling quality. Several different forms of signals of
quality have been examined in existing literature, including advertising (Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984;
Milgrom and Roberts 1986), pricing (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991), warranties (Lutz, 1989), money-
back guarantee (Moorthy and Srinivasan, 1995), umbrella branding (Wernerfelt, 1988), and scarcity
10 Associated Press, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20130106/WIRE/130109747
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(Stock and Balachander, 2005). Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. We show that
capacity rationing in advance selling can be used to signal quality and we also evaluate how efficient
signaling through rationing is, compared to other signaling tools such as pricing and advertising.
Among the signaling literature, Stock and Balachander (2005) is closest to our paper. It considers
scarcity as a signal of quality. They show that a seller who has sufficient capacity to meet all demand
may intentionally dispose some of the capacity to create scarcity for uninformed customers (“follow-
ers”). Thus, a high-quality seller signals quality by making product scarce for followers and charging
full-information price for all customers. This strategy is optimal under two conditions: informed cus-
tomers make purchase first (before followers) and price is constant over two periods. Even though both
models use sales quantity as a signal of quality, our model is substantially different. First, we assume
that quality uncertainty exists before the product is released (e.g., wine en primeur or pre-sale of a
video game), and is resolved at the product release (e.g., when wines are released to consumers or the
game hits the store). Stock and Balachander (2005) assume the exact opposite: quality is perfectly
known in advance, but only to advance customers (“innovators”). Second, in our setting, the seller
can dynamically change price over time and the advance customers can strategically choose when to
buy, i.e., whether to buy in advance under imperfect quality information or wait till information is
publicly revealed in spot. Such strategic customer behavior is supported by many empirical evidences
(Su, 2007; Aviv and Pazgal, 2008) and is not captured in Stock and Balachander (2005). Third, while
their model assumes that total capacity can be adjusted, all of the capacity must be available in
advance and the seller cannot limit the quantity sold in advance. In contrast, we consider allocation
of capacity between advance (before the product is available) and spot periods (after it is available).
Our paper is also related to the advance selling literature, especially papers considering consumer’s
uncertain valuations (e.g., Xie and Shugan, 2001; Gallego and Sahin, 2010; Prasad et al., 2010; Yu
et al., 2010; Chu and Zhang, 2011). All of the papers in this stream, except Chu and Zhang (2011),
assume that all information about the product is publicly available, i.e. sellers do not have any private
information. In contrast, our paper considers both customer uncertain valuation and seller’s private
information about quality. The impact of asymmetric quality information on the seller’s strategy and
profit from advance selling is, in fact, our focus. Among the above papers, Chu and Zhang (2011)
is the only work that considers sellers’ private information about quality. In their model the seller
decides the amount of quality information to release in advance. The paper shows how this decision
affects customers’ valuation of the product. In contrast, the seller in our model cannot and does not
directly control the information released in advance. Quality information can only be inferred through
the seller’s selling strategies (e.g., pricing and capacity rationing).
There are other papers that examine capacity rationing, but not in the context of advance selling.
Among these, Liu and van Ryzin (2008) show that capacity rationing can induce risk-averse customers
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to buy early at the regular price instead of waiting for a clearance price. Zhang and Cooper (2006)
evaluate the benefit of rationing with both fixed and flexible pricing. Gilbert and Klemperer (2000)
find that rationing is preferred to market-clearing price when customers incur seller-specific sunk cost.
These papers, however, all ignore the signaling effect of rationing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We define the problem and equilibrium concept in
§2 and provide some preliminary results in §3. In §4, the seller’s optimal (equilibrium) strategy when
there is no quality uncertainty (full-information case) is presented. §5 and §6 are the main thrusts of
the paper. In §5, we present the equilibrium strategy and outcome when quality is uncertain and the
seller has the option of rationing capacity. In §6, we evaluate the value of rationing and characterize
the conditions under which the seller prefers signaling through rationing. In §7, we compare rationing
with advertising, which is another signaling tool that has been extensively studied. We discuss several
extensions of our model and conclude the paper in §8. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a risk-neutral seller offering a product to risk-neutral customers over two periods, advance
period and spot period. While the seller knows the quality of the product in advance, the quality
is not observable by customers until the spot period. The seller decides the price and quantity that
she will offer in the advance period, and then later the price for the spot period. We assume that
customers are strategic and choose whether and when to buy the product. In what follows, we describe
the seller’s and the customer’s problems in detail, and then define the sequence of the events.
2.1. The Seller
The seller’s product can be of either high (H) or low (L) quality (with H > L). We assume that
the seller’s total capacity is T and the marginal production cost is c, both of which are common
knowledge.11 It should be noted that our analysis can be extended to the case where high-quality
products are more costly to produce and all of our results continue to hold. We follow the signaling
literature (see a comprehensive review in Sobel, 2007 or Kirmani and Rao, 2000) and assume that the
quality of the seller’s product is exogenously given and cannot be chosen by the seller.
To isolate the effect of rationing as a signal, we assume that the seller’s capacity is exogenously
determined and that the seller does not have freedom to change her capacity. There are a number
of examples supporting this. For instance, only the grapes harvested from a certain lot can become
Premier Cru, thus the total capacity cannot be changed freely by the seller. For the event ticket
selling, exactly 58,000 tickets are available for the 2013 Burning Man Festival, because the number of
attendants is regulated by Pershing County, Nevada, where the festival takes place. Similarly, the total
number of tickets for the 2013 Ultra Music Festival requires approval from the Miami-Dade County.
11 We follow Stock and Balachander (2005) and consider the case when the seller’s marginal cost is independent of quality:
high-quality and low-quality sellers have the same constant marginal cost of production. Walton (1986) and Srinivasan
and Lovejoy (1997) show that high-quality products are not necessarily more costly to produce. For instance, the prices
of some wines are largely distanced from their production costs, see http://www.wineanorak.com/whydoeswinecost.htm.
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2.2. The Customers
Customers are strategic and risk-neutral: they choose the option that maximizes their expected utility
when facing multiple purchasing opportunities. If customers do not buy the product, their reservation
utility is zero. Otherwise, a customer’s net utility is U = t+α−p, where p is the price of the product,
t ∈ {H,L} represents the product quality (H or L), and α is the customer’s private valuation that
captures the heterogeneity in individual customer’s willingness-to-pay. In particular, α corresponds
to the combined effect of all idiosyncratic factors, such as individual preferences about the flavor of
the wines or customers’ mood at the time of consumption (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990). Without
loss of generality, we assume that the sum of quality and individual valuation, t+α, is nonnegative
for all realizations. We note that all derived results also hold for a multiplicative utility function (i.e.,
U = αt− p).
In advance, customers are uncertain about both quality t and their individual valuations α’s, both
of which are resolved in the spot period. For example, in the primeur market, customers are uncertain
not only about wine quality, but also about their individual valuation of consumption, because the
wine is still in developing stage and only available (if any) for barrel tasting of work-in-progress.
Similarly, customers prepaying for festivals are unsure about both the quality of the event (which
depends on, e.g., which DJs will perform at the Ultra Music Festival), and their personal states (e.g.,
mood, health, scheduling conflicts) on the event date.
Specifically, let q to be the probability that the product quality is high (H), a common prior for all
customers in the advance period. While individual valuations are different for different customers in
spot, in advance they all follow the same prior distribution with cdf G(·) and pdf g(·). This approach
is taken by several papers on advance selling including Xie and Shugan (2001), Gallego and Sahin
(2010), Prasad et al. (2010), and Nasiry and Popescu (2012). Throughout the paper, we impose the
following assumptions on the distribution function G(·):
(1) G(·) is twice continuously differentiable and has a finite support [α,α].
(2) g(·) =G′(·)> 0 on (α,α) and is log-concave.
(3) For any k ∈ [0,1],
(
G(x)G(x)
g(x)
)′
+G(x)− k crosses zero at most once and from above.12
These assumptions are not very restrictive and cover many distributions and their truncated versions,
including uniform, exponential, logistic, normal, extreme-value, power, Weibull, beta, gamma, and
χ (χ2) with most parameter values. Note that condition (2) implies that the distribution has an
increasing failure rate (IFR) and that the tail distribution G(·) = 1−G(·) has an inverse on [0,1],
which we denote by (G)−1(·).
Following the standard approach in the advance-selling literature (see Xie and Shugan 2001, Gallego
and Sahin 2010, Yu et al. 2010, to name a few), we use the fluid model, where the proportion of
customers with an individual valuation less than or equal to x is G(x).
12 A function a(·) crosses zero at most once and from above, if and only if a(x0)< 0 implies a(x)< 0 for all x> x0.
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2.3. The Game
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. N1 customers who are uncertain about both product
quality, t, and individual valuation, αi, arrive in the advance period. The seller decides whether to
offer advance selling and, if so, announces the advance price, p1, and the rationing decision, S, which
is maximum the seller is willing to sell in advance.
Upon observing the seller’s offer, customers update their belief about the product quality. Let
b(p1, S) denote customers’ posterior belief about the probability that the seller offers high-quality
products. Based on this updated belief, customers decide whether to buy in advance or to wait and
postpone the purchasing decision till the spot period.
In the spot period, another cohort of N2 customers arrive and the seller sells the remaining quantity
at price p2. At this time, the product is available for consumption and the product quality and
customers’ individual valuations become known to themselves. All the remaining customers, including
those who have not bought in advance and those who arrived in spot, decide whether to buy in spot
with the full information. At the end of the spot period, consumption takes place and there is no
salvage value for any unsold capacity. Note that having two separate streams of arrivals, N1 and N2,
allows us to capture situations in which not every customer is aware of the product in the advance
period. For example, while some consumers may become aware of the release of a new game and
place a pre-order, others (who may have the same willingness to pay) may not realize or be aware
of the product release until the game actually hits the shelf, see Prasad et al. (2008) and Stock and
Balanchander (2005) for more examples and discussion. Furthermore, all of our results hold for the
case N2 = 0: a single stream of buyers arriving in the advance period.
N
1
customers arrive
Time
Seller announces (p1, S)
Customers decide whether 
to buy in advance or wait
Individual valuation and 
quality are revealed
N
2
customers arrive
Seller announces p2
Customers decide 
whether to buy in spot
Figure 1 Sequence of events
In our model, the seller’s rationing decision is observable to the customers. As reported in trade arti-
cles (e.g., Prial, 1989), chateaus release a portion of wines for sales during en primeur. Some vineyards
announce the total quantity and the amount they sell in advance up front. For instance, Midsum-
mer Cellar, a Californian winery located in St. Helena, announced that, for their 2010 Canon Creek
Cabernet Sauvignon, only 100 cases (1,200 bottles) out of 300 cases would be available during the
advance purchaseperiod.13 Similarly, the organizers of the 2013 Burning Man Festival pre-announced
13 http://www.midsummercellars.com/Futures.htm
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at the beginning of a selling season how many tickets would be available at each of the sales dates
and committed to this specific plan (e.g., 3,000 in December 2012, 40,000 in February 2013, and 1,000
in August 2013). The holiday sales took place on December 20, 2012, and in fact, all 3,000 allocated
tickets were sold in a matter of hours14 and the press repeatedly reported the sales of the tickets.15 The
commitment to the quantity sold in advance can be verified – if in dispute, a judge can order ex post
to audit sales data to verify that the announced quantity was indeed sold. The credibility of commit-
ment is tightly linked to the reputation of the seller as well. Su and Zhang (2009) say “when stocking
quantities and service levels are verifiable ex post, the seller may be averse to misrepresentation due
to reputation concerns.”
We assume that the seller determines and announces the spot price at the beginning of the spot
period. If the seller can commit to a spot price during advance selling, then the spot price itself may
be used as a signal of quality. Such signaling role of price has been studied in a static model (one-shot
sales) by Bagwell and Riordan (1991). However, in some situations it is difficult to commit to a certain
spot price. For example, the spot price of a wine (often 2-3 years after the en primeur) is influenced
by the seller’s production process that has not yet taken place.
2.4. Equilibrium Concepts
Our signaling game is a sequential game with incomplete information and the equilibrium concept
we employ is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Katok et al., 2012).
Typically, two classes of PBE, separating and pooling equilibria, exist for a signaling game. In a
separating equilibrium, a high-quality seller can successfully distinguish himself from a low-quality
seller during the advance sales. This can be done by choosing a strategy that the low-quality seller
does not have an incentive to mimic. Consequently, customers can perfectly infer the seller’s type.
In contrast, in a pooling equilibrium, the high-quality seller cannot economically differentiate himself
and both types of sellers adopt the same strategy in advance. Resultantly, customers cannot infer any
information about the quality of the seller in equilibrium.
In our game, the seller has two potential tools to signal quality to customers in the advance period:
price and capacity ration. Hence, we define a separating equilibrium as an equilibrium in which either
only one of the two types of sellers offer advance selling, or both types sell in advance but differ in their
advance prices or/and capacity rations. On the other hand, we define a pooling equilibrium as one in
which either both types of sellers only sell in spot, or both types sell in advance and use the same
14 Associated Press, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20130106/WIRE/130109747
15 The official website of the burning man festival: http://blog.burningman.com/2013/01/news/burning-man-2013-ticket-
sales/,
Associated Press, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20130106/WIRE/130109747,
Burning Man announces ticket plan with $380 set price, Reno Cazette-Journal,
http://www.rgj.com/article/20130105/EVENTS04/301050046/Burning-Man-announces-ticket-plan-380-set-price
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advance price and ration. To avoid trivialities, we focus on the set of participating equilibria where, if
an advance offer is made in equilibrium, the customers’ response in equilibrium is to accept the offer
and buy in advance. If a seller makes an advance offer which is rejected by customers in equilibrium,
then it is equivalent to the seller not offering any advance selling. The concept of “participating
equilibrium” is also used in economics and finance literature, e.g., Janssen et al. (2005) and Easley
and O’Hara (2009).
In addition, to limit the number of equilibria in a signaling game, we apply the intuitive criterion by
Cho and Kreps (1987) for customers’ beliefs on off-equilibrium paths. The intuitive criterion requires
that, if an off-equilibrium strategy makes only one type of the seller strictly better off than the same
seller following the equilibrium strategy, then observing this specific strategy enables the customers
to correctly identify the seller’s type. In addition to the intuitive criterion, we also impose the Pareto-
dominance: if multiple equilibria exist, we will focus on the equilibrium that Pareto dominates all
the other ones from the seller’s point of view, i.e., the equilibrium where both types of the seller
obtain (weakly) higher profits than they do in any other equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is a focal
equilibrium and is supported by evidence from behavioral experiments (Schelling, 1960). Also, since
in our model the seller moves first, the seller can always choose the equilibrium most appealing to
himself and expects customers to foresee his choice. If there are multiple equilibria and both types of
sellers are indifferent in choosing any of them, we will focus on the equilibrium at which the advance
sales is the largest (lexicographically largest, similar to Federgruen and Heching 1999).
In the next section, we formally formulate the problem and provide preliminary results. In the
following sections, we consider a baseline case, where advance customers know the true quality (full-
information setting) and then proceed to the focus of the paper: when advance customers are uncertain
about quality (asymmetric-information setting).
3. Formulation and Preliminary Results
Following backward induction, we first examine the seller’s decision in the spot period, when quality
information is fully revealed.
3.1. Spot Period
Consider a subgame where the seller sold S units in the advance period. Since the seller’s total capacity
is T and the number of advance customers is N1, clearly S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)], the remaining capacity is
T −S, and there are N1 +N2−S customers in the spot period. Since the customers know the product
quality and their individual valuation, a customer with valuation α will buy the product of quality t,
t=H,L, in spot if and only if her utility is nonnegative, i.e., U = t+α− p2 ≥ 0 or α≥ p2− t. Hence,
the number of customers who want to buy the product in spot is (N1 +N2−S)G(p2− t).
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As the sales quantity in the spot period is the smaller of the seller’s remaining capacity and the spot
demand, for given remaining capacity, T −S, the type-t seller chooses a spot price p2 to maximize the
expected spot profit pi2t(p2, S).
pi2t(p2, S) = p2 min{T −S, (N1 +N2−S)G(p2− t)} (1)
Let the optimal spot price be p∗2t(S) and the corresponding spot profit pi
∗
2t(S) = pi2t(p
∗
2t(S), S). The
following lemma characterizes p∗2t(S).
Lemma 1
p∗2t(S) = max
(
pU2t, p
B
2t(S)
)
=
{
pU2t if
T−S
N1+N2−S ≥G(pU2t− t)
pB2t(S) otherwise
(2)
where pU2t maximizes the unconstrained profit p2G(p2 − t) and pB2t(S) is the market-clearing price.
Specifically,
pU2t
{
∈ (t+α, t+α) and is a solution to pU2t = G(p
U
2t−t)
g(pU2t−t)
if t < t= 1
g(α) −α
= t+α if t≥ t¯
(3)
and G(pB2t(S)− t) = min
(
1, T−S
N1+N2−S
)
.
Lemma 1 shows that product quality, valuation uncertainty, and the seller’s remaining capacity all
play a role in the optimal spot price. When the product quality is high enough to dominate valuation
uncertainty (i.e., t > t) and the seller has sufficient capacity, the seller finds it optimal to sell to all
remaining customers by setting the spot price to t + α. With lower quality (t ≤ t), the seller with
sufficient capacity will charge an interior spot price. Thus, even when the seller has ample capacity,
the optimal price changes in product quality. The threshold quality, t, will play a role both in full
information and asymmetric information cases.
On the other hand, if the seller’s capacity is tight so that spot demand at pU2t exceeds the remaining
capacity T − S, it is optimal to charge the capacity clearing price, pB2t(S). Clearly, when the spot
price is raised from pU2t to p
B
2t(S), the profit is increased while the sales remain equal to the remaining
capacity. This also means that no shortage can take place in the spot period, which is summarized in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)], T −S ≥ (N1 +N2−S)G(p∗2t(S)− t).
The fact that shortage in supply never occurs in spot will affect the customers’ purchasing decision
in advance, and, consequently, the seller’s decision.
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3.2. Advance Period
If the seller decides not to sell in advance, setting advance ration S to zero, all N1 customers must wait
until the spot period and the seller’s total profit over the two periods is simply pi∗2t(0). If, however, the
seller offers advance selling with advance price p1 and positive capacity ration S, advance customers
update their belief about the probability of high quality to b(p1, S). Based on this belief, customers
choose to buy in advance or wait and delay the purchasing decision to spot, by comparing the expected
utilities. When purchasing in advance, a customer’s expected utility is UA(p1, S) = Eα,t[t + α− p1].
If she decides to wait, she will buy only if the revealed quality and individual valuation are high
enough. From Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, the expected utility from waiting to spot is UD(p1, S) =
Eα,t[max(t+α−p∗2t(S),0)]. Since UD ≥ 0, buying in the advance period is optimal for the customer if
and only if UA(p1, S)≥UD(p1, S), which is equivalent to
p1 ≤Eα,t [min(p∗2t(S), t+α)] (4)
Notice that the right-hand side of equation (4) provides the customer’s maximum willingness to
pay in advance. Intuitively, a customer would not pay any advance price higher than the expectation
of the minimum of spot price and total product value (the sum of quality and individual valuation),
since the customer always has the option of waiting to spot.
Although the customers will eventually realize valuations at the time of consumption, their decision
in the advance period is based on the expected utility. Because customers share the same ex ante
distribution about individual valuation, α, and the same updated belief about quality, t, they have
the same maximum willingness-to-pay, as expressed in equation (4).Consequently, for given price p1
and ration S > 0, either all or none of them buy in advance, resulting in the seller selling out all of
the S units or making no sales at all. Thus, for any ration S > 0, the seller can choose a price leading
to the sales of all S units.
After explicitly including the posterior belief b(p1, S) in equation (4) we have
p1 ≤ b(p1, S)p∗1H(S) + (1− b(p1, S))p∗1L(S) (5)
where p∗1t(S) = Eα[min(p
∗
2t(S), t+α)] represents advance customers’ maximum willingness-to-pay when
they believe the seller is of type t.
Let piat (p1, S, b) denote the expected total profit for a type-t seller who sets an advance price p1 and
rations capacity S to advance customers, who believe the seller to be of high type with probability
b = b(p1, S). Superscript a stands for asymmetric information. If the condition in equation (5) is
satisfied, all customers choose to buy in advance and the seller sells all S units. Thus, we have
piat (p1, S, b) = p1S +pi
∗
2t(S) (6)
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For p1 not satisfying equation (5), none of the customers buys in advance and the seller’s total profit
piat (p1, S, b) = pi
∗
2t(0). Thus, in correspondence to a set of customers’ beliefs {b(p1, S)}, the type-t seller
chooses the price-ration pair (p1, S) to maximize his expected total profit piat (p1, S, b).
Recall that we consider only participating equilibria, where the seller’s advance offer induces all
customers to buy in advance, i.e., equation (5) is satisfied. Since b(p1, S) ∈ [0,1], customers would
never buy at any price higher than p∗1H(S), and yet would always do so at a price lower than p
∗
1L(S).
For the remainder of the paper, when identifying participating equilibria, it suffices to consider only
feasible strategies: S = 0 (when p1 is irrelevant), or 0<S ≤min(T,N1) and p1 ∈ [p∗1L(S), p∗1H(S)].
Our objective is to evaluate the impact of asymmetric information about quality. To do this, we
first analyze a benchmark case in which customers know the true quality of the product in advance.
4. Base Case: Full Information about Quality
When customers know the true quality t in advance, for given advance ration S, their maximum
willingness-to-pay is simply p∗1t(S). Thus, p
∗
1t(S) is exactly the advance price the seller will quote: any
lower price is strictly dominated and any higher price is rejected by customers. With the optimal spot
and advance prices characterized as functions of S, the seller chooses a capacity ration S to maximize
her total expected profit, pift (S):
max
S∈[0,min(T,N1)]
pift (S) = p
∗
1t(S)S +pi
∗
2t(S) (7)
Denote the optimal ration under full information by Sft and the corresponding optimal advance price
by pf1t, where superscript f stands for the full information case. The following theorem characterizes
when it is optimal to use advance selling. Later we describe price pf1t and ration S
f
1t for each type.
Theorem 1
(a) There exist two critical numbers, T1 and TD, 0≤ T1 ≤ TD ≤N1 +N2, such that
• if T ≤ T1, then Sft = 0 [no advance selling],
• if T ∈ (T1, TD), then 0<Sft <min(T,N1) [limited advance selling],
• If TD ≤ T <N1 +N2 or T ≥N1 +N2 and t < t¯, then Sft = min(T,N1) [full advance selling],
• If T ≥N1 +N2 and t≥ t¯, then Sft is any value between zero and min(T,N1) [advance selling and
spot-only selling are equivalent].
(b) T1 and TD are independent of quality level.
In case when advance selling and spot-only selling are equivalent (the last bullet in part (a)), we
assume that the seller offers advance selling and ration S = min(T,N1) since the seller can accrue the
revenue early.
Advance selling allows the seller to take advantage of customers’ uncertainty about their individual
valuations. By offering a discount in advance, customers are willing to buy before their valuations are
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revealed. This discount increases the sales as well as the profit. Notice from Theorem 1 that the total
capacity plays a significant role: The seller prefers to offer advance selling (or at least is indifferent
between spot-only or advance selling) when the capacity is large. On the other hand, the seller rations
capacity in advance (S < min(T,N1)) when capacity is at intermediate level (T ∈ (T1, TD)). To see
why, note that the seller would be able to sell all of his capacity. However, for the case of full advance
selling, S = min(T,N1), a significant portion of customers would buy at a (possibly heavily) discounted
advance price, which erodes the seller’s ability to price discriminate. If, on the other hand, the seller
does not sell in advance, some capacity will never be used. Offering some quantity in advance not
only increases the sales quantity but also raises the spot price. The product quality affects the seller’s
policy, but only when the seller has large capacity (T ≥N1 +N2). If the product quality is very high
(t≥ t¯), it is optimal for the seller to set the price low enough so that all customers want to buy and
the seller becomes indifferent in selling the product between the two periods.
The obvious next questions are which of the two sellers – high-type or low-type – quotes a higher
price and which sells a bigger quantity in advance. The following theorem answers these questions.
Theorem 2 Consider full-information case.
(i) The two types of sellers always ration the same amount of capacity in advance, i.e., SfH = S
f
L.
(ii) When both types sell in advance (SfH > 0), the high-type seller charges a strictly higher advance
price, pf1H > p
f
1L.
As expected, the high-type seller charges a strictly higher price in advance. This is intuitive as
customers who are aware in advance of quality are willing to pay more for high quality. However,
the two types of sellers always ration the same amount of capacity in advance. This is because, the
difference in quality is perfectly captured by the price difference. Thus, in the full-information setting,
quality difference is only reflected in price. We shall see that the result is drastically different when
customers are uncertain about the quality.
5. Asymmetric Information about Quality
We now study the case when customers in the advance period are not sure about the product quality.
We examine if the seller benefits by signaling product quality through the terms of advance selling
(i.e., price and quantity) and, when pricing and rationing are both available to signal quality, we
characterize which of the two levers is more effective for the seller. We will show that, unlike the
full-information case where quality can be conveyed by price, the quality uncertainty forces a seller to
distort both the price and rationing to signal the product quality. We first characterize the properties
of a separating equilibrium, where the terms of advance selling perfectly communicate the quality
information to customers. We then examine pooling equilibria, where advance selling is uninformative
about the quality.
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In preparation for equilibrium analysis, it is useful to examine the seller’s profit in a special case,
where all consumers believe that the product quality is high, that is, b(p1, S) = 1. We will show the
“single-crossing” property (Athey, 2001) holds in this case, which will be used later for the general
setting. When b(p1, S) = 1, customers believe that the true quality is high and would accept any
feasible advance price, p1 ≤ p∗1H(S). Hence, the type-t seller’s total profit is
piat (p1, S,1) = p1S +pi
∗
2t(S) (8)
where superscript a stands for asymmetric information. The following lemma shows that iso-profit
curves of the two types of seller satisfy the single-crossing property.
Lemma 2
Consider S > 0 and b= 1. Iso-profit curves for two types of sellers (low and high) cross at most once.
When they cross, the high type’s iso-profit curve crosses the low type’s from below, i.e., the high type’s
iso-profit curve is below the low type’s on the left of the crossing point and is above on the right.
Figure 2 illustrates Lemma 2. A point, (p1, S), represents the seller’s strategy – its advance price
and rationed quantity, respectively. The two increasing curves, p∗1L(S) and p
∗
1H(S), represent the lower
and upper bounds of the feasible price for given rationing quantity, S > 0. Inside the feasible region,
we show iso-profit curves, one for high-type seller and one for low-type seller. For each type of the
seller, the total profit remains constant on the corresponding iso-profit curve. This single-crossing
property is important in our analysis. It is used to show that the high-type seller will decrease its
rationing quantity to signal its quality during advance selling (Theorem 3). It is also used to show
that certain pooling equilibria will be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (Theorem 4).
 
p1
S
p1H
* (S)
π a (p1,S,1)= k1H
π a (p1,S,1)= k2L
0
p1L
* (S)
Figure 2 Single crossing of iso-profit curves for b= 1 (k1, k2 are constants)
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5.1. Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, the seller’s quality will be fully revealed in the advance period since low-
and high-type sellers use different strategies. In the context of our game, a separating equilibrium
must follow one of the following cases: (1) either only one type of seller offers advance selling, or
(2) both do, but they are different in price, in quantity rationed, or in both. Denote type-t seller’s
equilibrium strategy pair by (pa1t, S
a
t ), where t=H or L. In any separating equilibrium, customers can
infer the true quality: b(pa1H , S
a
H) = 1 and b(p
a
1L, S
a
L) = 0.
Following standard argument, it is straightforward to show that, in any separating equilibrium, the
low-type seller’s strategy is always the same as under the full information, i.e., pa1L = p
f
1L and S
a
L = S
f
L.
This can be shown by following the standard arguments as in, e.g., Lutz (1989) and Sobel (2007):
since the low-type seller is always perfectly discerned in a separating equilibrium, the above strategy
will yield the highest payoff for her. On the other hand, the problem that the high-type seller needs
to solve is as follows:
(pa1H , S
a
H) = arg max
p1,S
piaH(p1, S,1) = p1S +pi
∗
2H(S)
subject to: S = 0 or {S ∈ (0,min(T,N1)] and p1 ∈ [p∗1L(S), p∗1H(S)]} (9)
piaL(p1, S,1)≤ piaL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
(10)
piaH(p1, S,1)≥ piaH
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
(11)
(p1, S) 6=
(
pf1L, S
f
L
)
(12)
In the above formulation, the high-type seller maximizes his own profit, subject to the following four
constraints: first, the feasibility condition defined in §3.2; second and third, the low type prefers to be
perceived as a low type, rather than imitate the high type’s strategy and the high type does not have
an incentive to imitate the low type (incentive compatible); and last, the high type’s strategy is not
identical to the low type’s.
Figure 3 shows two iso-profit curves where the profit of each seller equals to the profit when both
sellers use the low type’s equilibrium strategy. Clearly these two curves contain (and thus cross at)
the strategy point (pf1L, S
f
L). Note that the seller’s profit will increase if she manages to sell all the
S units at a higher advance price p1. Hence, the points above a given iso-profit curve correspond to
higher profits. By the single-crossing property (Lemma 2) and the incentive-compatibility constraints,
only the points inside the shaded area are feasible strategies for the high-type seller. From the graph,
any feasible point satisfies S < SfL, that is, to differentiate himself from the low-quality seller, the
high-quality seller should ration strictly lower capacity S during the advance sales. The next theorem
formally proves this result and shows that this separating equilibrium exists if and only if both sellers
are going to sell in the advance under the full information case.
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p1
S
(p f   , S f )1L L
π a (p1,S,1)= π 
a (p1L, SL,0)H H
f   f
π a (p1,S,1)= π 
a (p1L, SL,0)L L
f   f
(pa , Sa )1H H
0
p1H
* (S)
p1L
* (S)
Figure 3 A separating equilibrium
Theorem 3
(i) A separating equilibrium exists if and only if T > T1, in other words, if and only if the capacity is
sufficiently large so that advance selling is optimal for both types under the full-information case.
(ii) In a separating equilibrium, the low-type seller follows her full-information strategy (pf1L, S
f
L).
(iii) In a separating equilibrium, the following characterize the H-type seller’s rationing:
(a) the high-type seller rations strictly less than the low-type seller, SaH <S
a
L.
(b) the high-type seller rations strictly less than he would under the full information, SaH <S
f
H .
(c) When the high-type seller offers advance selling (SaH > 0), his price is lower than the price he
would charge under the full information: pa1H ≤ pf1H . This price, however, is the same as the price that
he would use when the same quantity SaH is sold in the full information case, i.e., p
a
1H = p
∗
1H(S
a
H).
(d) For given low quality L, the high-type seller’s equilibrium ration SaH is nonincreasing in his
quality H.
Theorem 3(i) implies that a separating equilibrium arises whenever capacity is not too limited
(T > T1) so that both sellers offer advance selling under the full information case (see Theorem 1).
Notice that no additional condition is required for the existence of a separating equilibrium. It implies
that under fairly general conditions, the high-type seller can distinguish from the low-type with the
terms of advance selling, (p1, S). On the other hand, if the capacity is tight (T ≤ T1), this separating
equilibrium breaks apart as neither type wants to sell in advance under the full information.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3 further characterize this separating equilibrium. The information
asymmetry only affects the high-type seller as the low-type seller follows her strategy in the full
information case. The high-type seller needs to distort his strategy from the full-information levels and
differentiate himself from the low-type. What is interesting is how the high-type seller accomplishes
it. If both sellers offered the same quantity during the advance sales, the high-type’s advance price
would be higher and, consequently, low-type seller could increase her profit by matching the high-type
seller’s advance price, without any consequence on low-type’s profits in spot. To signal his type, the
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high-type seller needs to change the ration for advance sales. Part (iii-a) shows the high-type seller will
decrease the quantity available during the advance sales to the extent that cannot be economically
mimicked by low type. Note that for a given advance price, reducing the capacity ration will decrease
both types’ advance profits by the same amount. However, in the spot period where the quality
information is revealed, the high-type seller is able to charge a higher spot price than a low-type seller.
Consequently, decreasing the advance sales hurts the low-type seller more than the high-type seller.
Part (iii-b) immediately follows from Theorem 2, SfL = S
f
H , and part (ii), S
a
L = S
f
L. Reducing the ration
signals the product quality in the following way. Customers, upon observing that only a small portion
of the total capacity is offered in advance, infer that the seller is very confident about her quality and
reserves a lot to sell in the spot period. In contrast, a large ration in advance will be associated with
low quality, as the low-type seller expects a weak spot market and has a strong incentive to sell a
lot in advance. Part (iii-d) reinforces this intuition. As the quality difference increases, the high-type
seller will reserve more capacity to sell in the spot market.
Part (iii-c) explains how the high-type seller changes the advance selling price. One may think that
the high-type seller should increase the advance price as he reduces the advance ration. However, the
effect is exactly opposite. As the capacity ration decreases, more capacity is available in spot and spot
price decreases. As spot price decreases, customers are willing to pay less in advance. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that this price change is simply a consequence of the change in the seller’s rationing
rather than the seller’s deliberate attempt to use price as a signal. To see this, notice that the high-
type seller offers the same price as he would when he sells the quantity SaH under the full information
case, implying that there is no additional price distortion due to information asymmetry.
It should be noted that the high-type seller uses the exactly opposite strategy to what he would do
under the full information case. In the full information case (see §4), price is the signal, and rationing
is not: both sellers use the same rationing policy, but a high-type seller charges a higher price to
differentiate from a low-type seller. In the asymmetric information case, price cannot signal quality,
while rationing can.
5.2. Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium, both sellers follow the same strategy during the advance sales – i.e., either
both types sell in advance with the same price and ration, or neither sells in advance, thus the quality
information will not be revealed. We show that applying the intuitive criterion eliminates a pooling
equilibrium in which both sellers offer advance selling.
Theorem 4 By the Intuitive Criterion, a pooling equilibrium where both types offer the same quantity
during advance sales cannot be sustained.
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Figure 4 illustrates why this is the case. Suppose a pooling equilibrium (pE1 , S
E) exists with SE > 0.
Such strategy (a point in Figure 4) must be in the interior of the feasible region. Customers would not
pay any advance price greater than or equal to p∗1H when they believe that the product might be sold
by a low-quality seller. On the other hand, any price less than or equal to p∗1L is Pareto-dominated
from the sellers’ perspectives. From the single-crossing property (Lemma 2), the high-type seller’s iso-
profit curve must lie below the low-type’s curve for S ∈ (0, SE), and the two curves cross at (pE1 , SE).
Hence, if the high-type seller unilaterally reduces the advance ration and deviates to (p′1, S
′) for some
0<S′ <SE, this move will make the high-type seller strictly better off and the low-type strictly worse
off. From the intuitive criterion, customers will believe that the seller is the high-type. This supports
the high-type’s unilateral deviation and breaks the pooling equilibrium.
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Figure 4 Intuitive criterion eliminates a pooling equilibrium
Theorem 4 further highlights why rationing can be effectively used to signal quality. As long as
advance selling is desirable, the high-type seller would never pool with the low-type seller during
advance sales, since he can gain more from revealing himself to customers by unilaterally lowering the
capacity ration in advance.
5.3. Structure of Equilibrium
Following Theorems 3 and 4, we further characterize the seller’s equilibrium strategies as functions of
capacity T and quality levels L and H. Theorem 5 summarizes the result.
Theorem 5 When quality information is asymmetric in advance, equilibrium strategies are as fol-
lows:
i) If T ≤ T1, neither type offers advance selling.
ii) If T ∈ (T1, TD), both types offer limited advance selling, and the high-type seller rations less in
advance than the low-type seller.
iii) If T ∈ [TD,N1 +N2), both types offer advance selling, and the high-type seller limits the advance
sales while the low-type does not.
iv) If T ≥N1 +N2, then the equilibrium depends on the values of L and H. Specifically,
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a. if L< t¯, the high-type offers limited advance selling and the low-type offers full advance selling.
b. if L≥ t¯, the high-type only sells in spot while the low-type is indifferent between offering advance
selling and selling only in spot.
Theorem 5 implies that the quality uncertainty does not affect the strategy and profit of the low-
quality seller. However, the high-type seller has to sacrifice a portion of his profit by limiting the
amount sold in advance (and possibly also lowering the price quoted in advance) to differentiate his
type during advance sales. One may expect that in such a case, the high-quality seller is less likely to
sell in advance. Interestingly, as long as advance selling is strictly preferred by the high type under the
full-information setting (parts ii-iv.a of Theorem 5), the high-quality seller continues to offer advance
selling. Although information asymmetry reduces the profit gain achieved by advance selling, its effect
does not distort the seller’s strategy enough to abandon advance selling. Reducing rationing quantity
is sufficient to differentiate his type from the low-quality seller. The only exception to this rule is the
case iv-b, when the seller has large capacity, T ≥N1 +N2, and the quality of the low-type product
exceeds the threshold, t¯. In this situation, the seller has so much capacity and finds it optimal to sell
to all customers. Hence, in the full information case, the seller charges the same price in both advance
and spot period (see Theorem 1). But, when the quality is uncertain and the high-type seller offers
the same rationing quantity as the low-type seller, the low-type seller can easily mimic the high-type
and remove the ability to signal. Consequently, the high-type seller is better off selling only in spot.
6. Value of Rationing
Our previous results show that in the presence of quality uncertainty, sellers can signal quality by
limiting the amount sold in advance. One interesting question that follows is how big the benefit
from such signaling is. In the full information case, an option to ration capacity never hurts the seller
since it gives the seller more choices in allocating capacity: instead of 0 or min(T,N1), S could be
any quantity S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)]. In fact, as shown in part (a) of Theorem 1, rationing makes the
seller strictly better off when his capacity is at an intermediate level. The value of capacity rationing,
however, becomes less evident when quality is uncertain. This is because, while the ability to ration
helps the high-type seller to differentiate from the low-type seller, signaling by reducing the ration in
the advance sales will decrease the profit.
To examine whether the seller always benefits from rationing, we first examine the equilibrium
outcome when sellers cannot ration their capacity during the advance selling. That is, if the seller
offers advance selling, he needs to accept all demand up to his total capacity: S = min(N1, T ). A few
observations immediately follow under the no-rationing case. If both sellers set to offer advance selling,
the quantity will be the same, and the low-type seller has an incentive to mimic the high-type seller’s
price. Consequently, the high-type seller can never differentiate himself by advance selling. Theorem
6 characterizes the equilibrium for the no-rationing case.
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Theorem 6 For given H, let δ = H − L denote the difference in quality levels. When rationing is
not allowed (i.e., S = min(T,N1) or 0), there exist a function tD(T ) such that the following holds in
equilibrium,
i) If L> tD(T ), neither type sells in advance,
ii) If L≤ tD(T )<H, only the low-type seller offers advance selling.
iii) If H ≤ tD(T ), there exists a threshold δ¯≥ 0 and a function q¯(δ)∈ [0,1] for δ > 0 such that
a. if δ > δ¯ and q < q¯(δ), only the low-type sells in advance,
b. otherwise (i.e., δ≤ δ¯ or q≥ q¯(δ)), both types sell in advance with a common advance price.
Part i) of Theorem 6 implies that, when sellers cannot ration, neither seller offers advance selling
when the qualities of both types are sufficiently high (L> tD(T )). When this happens, neither seller
benefits from advance selling at a discounted price. When the quality of the low-type product falls
below the threshold, tD(T ), at least one of the two sellers offers advance selling in equilibrium. The
low-type seller has incentive to sell as much as possible in advance before the quality information
is revealed. The high-type seller chooses to sell in advance only if customers strongly believe that
the product quality (the probability that the seller is a high-type) is high, q ≥ q(δ), or the quality
difference is sufficiently small, δ ≤ δ. In such cases, a pooling equilibrium where both types charge a
sufficiently high price in advance emerges, and both sellers benefit from selling in advance (compared
to selling only in spot).
We now compare the equilibria under rationing (Theorem 5) and no rationing (Theorem 6) cases.
We find that having an operational flexibility to ration does not necessarily benefit the seller. In other
words, both sellers can be better off when they do not have the ability to ration. To see why this is the
case, notice that the high-quality seller always uses rationing to signal his quality as long as advance
selling is desirable. Thus, in the no-rationing pooling equilibrium, the low-type seller may be able to
hide her inferior quality and quote a higher advance price compared to a separating equilibrium that
arises in the rationing case. Thus, the low-type seller will be better off without the ability to ration.
Interestingly, the inability to ration can benefit the high-type seller too. While rationing enables the
seller to signal its type, this signaling can be costly as the high-type seller is forced to reduce the
amount sold in advance and to lower both spot and advance prices. The cost associated with signaling
can outweigh any profit incurred by the pooling equilibrium in the no-rationing case.
Figure 5 illustrates in more details how both sellers can be strictly better off in the no-rationing
equilibrium. According to Theorem 6, an outcome where both sellers offer the full advance selling
at the same price (point NR) is a pooling equilibrium when rationing is disallowed. Suppose now
that both sellers can ration their capacity in advance. First note that from Theorem 4, no pooling
equilibrium where both types sell in advance can be sustained, thus NR cannot be an equilibrium and
a deviation must occur. In this situation, the low-type seller will follow its full-information strategy
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Figure 5 An example where both types are strictly worse off by capacity rationing: q = 0.9, N1 = 10, N2 = 10,
α∼Uniform[−5,5], T = 11, H = 35, L= 30. For the labelled points, the corresponding strategy pair and profits for
type-t seller, (p1, S;piaL(p1, S,1), pi
a
H(p1, S,1)), are as follows: NR(34.45,10; 378.5,383.5), RL(29.75,8.39; 335.1,348.1),
RH(33.69777,1.62; 335.1,381.9).
(point RL) (see Theorem 3). Consider the iso-profit curve for the low-type that runs through RL. Any
point above this curve cannot be chosen by the high-type, as it can be mimicked profitably by the low-
type seller (this is formally written in the constraint (10)). To prevent the low-type from mimicking,
the high-type needs to lower ration to a point where low-type is indifferent between mimicking and
following her full-information strategy. But, doing so will also lower both advance and spot prices and
erode the seller’s profit (point RH). At this point, both sellers earn strictly lower profits than in the
no-rationing situation. In short, the high-type seller is worse off because signaling costs too much and
the low-type seller is worse off as it cannot pool with the high type. Hence, both sellers would prefer
not having the ability to ration.
An immediate question is why both sellers are not able to follow a pooling equilibrium when they
have the flexibility to ration. The answer is that, similarly to the prisoner’s dilemma, the no-rationing
equilibrium, while achieving the Pareto-dominant outcome, cannot be enforced once rationing becomes
feasible. The high-type seller, induced by short-term increase of profit, cannot resist the temptation to
deviate to reduce the rationing in advance. This incentive of rationing, however, triggers a downward
spiral, leading to the outcome where both parties lose.
It should be noted that the phenomenon that pooling is better for both sellers occurs only when
customers strongly believe that the product quality is high (i.e., q is high). In fact, it can be shown
that, ceteris paribus, the value of rationing decreases in the prior belief, q. As q increases, customers
are more optimistic about high quality and are willing to pay a higher price. On the other hand,
as Theorem 5 illustrates, the rationing equilibrium is independent of the prior belief q. Hence, as q
increases, the increase in the pooling price makes the no-rationing pooling equilibrium more appealing
and thus the rationing option becomes less desirable. Our result shows that while capacity rationing
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can signal quality, it is sometimes costly and makes both sellers worse off compared to the no-rationing
case. As the prior belief of high quality decreases, the value of rationing increases.
7. Signaling: Rationing versus Advertising
So far we have shown that a seller can use capacity rationing to signal product quality during the
advance sales. We now elaborate how capacity rationing differs from advertising, another signaling
tool that has been studied extensively in the literature. Although advertisement can help the seller
in many different ways (e.g., raising the willingness to pay, increasing the market size), we consider
a pure signaling role of advertisement. Thus, we assume that advertising affects neither valuation
distribution nor market size. Instead, we consider the case where advertising is a pure dissipative
cost that the seller incurs to its customers for signaling. Such uninformative advertising has been
considered in the literature, see Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell
and Ramey (1988), Stock and Balachander (2005), and the references therein.
If customers were perfectly informed about product quality in advance, advertising would not be
used in our settings. With unknown quality, advertising may enable the seller to convince customers
about quality of the product and charge a higher price during the advance sales. Clearly, there is no
benefit of advertising if the seller sells only in the spot period, when quality is already revealed.
To evaluate effectiveness of advertising in our setting, consider a case when seller uses adverting
in the advance period instead of rationing. That is, S must be either zero (no advance sales) or
min(T,N1), and advertising may be used in advance. All other settings, including the sequence of
events, are the same as before. In the first stage, the seller decides whether to offer advance selling or
not, i.e., S = 0 or min(T,N1). If he does (S = min(T,N1)), then the seller chooses the advance price
p1 and the advertising expenditure A. Having observed the price and advertising expense, customers
form a posterior belief about the product being high quality, denoted by b(p1, S,A). For given posterior
belief, the maximum price that customers will accept during the advance period is b(p1, S,A)p∗1H(S)+
(1 − b(p1, S,A))p∗1L(S). Hence, the seller offers an advance selling if p1 ≤ b(p1, S,A)p∗1H(S) + (1 −
b(p1, S,A))p∗1L(S). The seller’s expected profit over the two periods is
pia,ADt (p1, S,A, b) = p1S +pi
∗
2t(S)−A.
Otherwise, the seller’s profit is pia,ADt (p1, S,A, b) = pi
∗
2t(0). The next result characterizes the equilibrium.
Theorem 7 (i) If H ≤ tD(T ) and δ≤ δ, there exists a separating equilibrium under which both types
offer full advance selling, but only the high-type seller advertises. In all other cases, no seller advertises.
(ii) The separating equilibrium in part (i) is Pareto-dominated by a no-advertising pooling equilibrium.
Under the separating equilibrium described in part (i), the high-type seller proves his type through
advertising that the low-type seller cannot afford. This equilibrium can be sustained only when both
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types find it optimal to sell in advance under the full information case (H ≤ tD(T )) and the quality
difference is sufficiently small (δ≤ δ). The first condition is straight-forward because, if a seller prefers
spot-only selling under the full information case, his preference would remain the same in the asym-
metric information case, since advertising only decreases the seller’s profit from advance selling. For
the second condition, notice that the difference in the advance prices between the two types of seller
will be large when the quality difference is large. Consequently, it is very attractive for the low-type to
mimic the high-type. To separate from the low-type, the high-type needs to incur a high advertising
cost, which makes advance selling less appealing. When the quality difference is sufficiently large, the
high-type is better off selling only in spot.
Even when the separating equilibrium in part (i) can be sustained, the high type has to spend
significantly on advertising. In fact, the expected profit that the high-type seller earns from sales in the
advance period will be the same as that of the low-type seller. To see why, first recall that since the true
quality will be revealed in spot, the advertisement intends to influence the advance sales and profit.
In the separating equilibrium where both offer full advance selling, although the high type charges a
higher advance price than the low type, any extra revenue that the high-type earns will be fully offset
by the advertising cost - otherwise it will incentivize the low type to mimic. Under this situation,
there is another equilibrium that is better for both types of seller: pooling with no advertisement. The
low type earns more than under the separating equilibrium since the pooling price is higher than her
separating price, and the high-type is better off pooling as he does not incur advertising cost. It can
be shown that this pooling equilibrium Pareto dominates the separating equilibrium. Obviously, our
analysis assumes a very limited role of advertising. Advertising may increase the valuation distribution
or market size, factors we do not study in this paper.
Now, consider the case that the seller is allowed to ration, i.e., S can be any value between zero and
min(T,N1). Applying similar analysis, it can be shown that the intuitive criterion used in Theorem
4 rules out any pooling equilibrium in which both types sell in advance. Also, in any separating
equilibrium, only the high-type seller will signal its quality as the low-type seller will follow his full-
information strategy
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
and place no advertisement. It turns out that the high-type seller
prefers to use rationing over advertising as a signal. The result is summarized below.
Theorem 8 Neither of the two sellers invests in advertising in any separating equilibrium.
Theorem 8 shows that signaling by rationing is more efficient than by advertising. To understand
this, compare these two signaling levers. Advertising is a pure cost to the seller: in other words, the
seller will not advertise if the product quality is publicly known. On the other hand, advance selling
(and capacity rationing) can increase seller’s profit even when there is no quality uncertainty (Theorem
1). Allowing the seller to choose its rationing quantity helps the seller (at least partially) offset the
signaling cost, as the seller can adjust availability and price in the spot period according to the cost
of signal.
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8. Conclusion
As advance selling has been rapidly adopted in practice, academic research has examined a number of
reasons why firms should offer advance selling. These reasons include consumer’s risk aversion (Png,
1989), advance demand information (Tang et al., 2004; Li and Zhang, 2012), and consumer’s valuation
uncertainty (Xie and Shugan, 2001; Gallego and Sahin, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first one that describes and analyzes the role of advance selling as a signal of product
quality. When consumers do not have perfect information about product quality, we show that the
seller can signal the product quality by rationing capacity available during advance sales.
We show that consumer’s uncertainty about product quality always worsens the profit of a seller
offering high-quality product, since his product cannot be fully appreciated during advance sales, with
consumers being doubtful about product quality. Pricing alone cannot be a signal for quality as the
low-type seller can easily mimic high-type seller. In order to differentiate herself from the low-quality
seller, the high-type seller sacrifices some profit by reducing its capacity ration during advance sales,
compared to the optimal level with known quality. While it may seem optimal for the high-quality
seller to bypass advance selling and sell only after the quality information is released, selling portion
of capacity in advance is typically better for the high-quality seller except for two special cases. The
first case is when the total capacity is very tight. In this case, the seller can clear the capacity at
a very high spot price and neither seller wants to sell in advance. Thus, the presence of low-quality
seller does not reduce the high-type seller’s profit. The second case is when the seller has a large
capacity and would like to sell to all customers by pricing the product very low. Instead of sending a
costly signal, the high-type seller sells only in the spot period while the low-type seller is indifferent
between advance selling and spot only. In all other cases, the high-quality seller uses reduced ration
as a primary signal device. Interestingly, as long as both types of sellers offer advance selling in the
full-information case, then the high-quality seller can use rationing to distinguish himself. Our finding
on rationing capacity to signal quality is consistent with several examples in practice. One of such
examples is the premium French wine’s advance (en primeur) market, where chateaux intentionally
limit the availability of wine sold in en primeur to convey high quality (Prial, 1989; Stimpfig, 2012).
Although rationing can be a very effective tool for signaling and for increasing profits, we show
that the seller does not always benefit from having operational flexibility to ration. When compared
to the case where rationing is not allowed, rationing flexibility can make both high-quality and low-
quality sellers strictly worse off. This happens when customers are optimistic about the product’s
high quality and the seller’s capacity is not too tight. While rationing enables the seller to signal its
type, reducing the amount that he sells in advance (and consequently lowering both spot and advance
prices) can outweigh any profit incurred by simply pooling with the low-type seller (which is the
outcome when rationing is not allowed). Since consumers are optimistic about product quality, the
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high-type seller does not lose too much by pooling with the low-type. We also compare the benefits of
signaling through rationing with uninformative advertising and show that rationing is more efficient.
All major results and insights carry through when the marginal cost of a high-quality product (cH)
is different from that of a low-quality seller (cL). All results also hold when the utility of a consumer
is a multiplicative function (U = αt− p) instead of an additive function (U = α+ t− p). The proofs
for these two variations are available in a supplementary document.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1
The proof, directly adapted from Yu et al. (2010), is provided in the supplementary document.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
(a) The proof, directly adapted from Yu et al. (2010), is provided in the supplementary document.
(b) First recall the definitions of T1 and TD in Yu et al. (2010): for T < N1 +N2 and S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)], let
fBt (S) = E[min(t+α,p
B
2t(S))]S + p
B
2t(S)(T −S). T1 is the largest T such that fBt (S) is maximized at S = 0 and
TD is the smallest T such that fBt (S) is maximized at S = min(T,N1).
To show that T1 and TD are independent of the quality level t, it then suffices to show that dfBt (S)/dS
is independent of t. To this end, note that by Lemma 1, pB2t(S) = t + (G)
−1( T−S
N1+N2−S ). Substituting this in
the expression of fBt (S), we have f
B
t (S) = E[min(α, (G)
−1( T−S
N1+N2−S ))]S + (G)
−1( T−S
N1+N2−S )(T −S) + tT , which
depends on t only through the term tT . Clearly, dfBt (S)/dS is independent of t, and hence, so are T1 and TD.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
The proof uses the following lemma. The proof of all the lemmas are available in the supplementary document.
Lemma C.1 p∗2H(S)≥ p∗2L(S), p∗1H(S)> p∗1L(S).
By Lemma C.1, to show pf1H > p
f
1L, it suffices to show S
f
H = S
f
L. Meanwhile, by Theorem 1, to show S
f
H = S
f
L,
it suffices to show that Sft is independent of t for T ∈ (T1, TD). By Yu et al. (2010), for T ∈ (T1, TD), Sft satisfies
dfBt (S)/dS = 0, where f
B
t (S) is as defined in the proof of Theorem 1 (b). Since df
B
t (S)/dS is independent of t
(shown in proof of Theorem 1 (b)), so is Sft for T ∈ (T1, TD).
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Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 2
The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma D.1 pi∗2H(S)−pi∗2L(S) strictly decreases in S.
For b = 1, S > 0, and constants k1 and k2, let the iso-profit curves of the high type for profit k1 and
of the low type for profit k2 be {(S,p1) : piaH(p1, S,1) = k1, (p1, S) is feasible} and {(S,p1) : piaL(p1, S,1) =
k2, (p1, S) is feasible}, respectively. We prove by contradiction that (i) they cross at most once and (ii) when
they do cross, the former crosses the latter from below.
(i) Suppose that the two curves cross at two distinct points (p′1, S
′) and (p′′1 , S
′′) with 0<S′′ ≤ S′. By definition of
the iso-profit curve, piaH(p
′
1, S
′,1) = piaH(p
′′
1 , S
′′,1) = k1 and piaL(p
′
1, S
′,1) = piaL(p
′′
1 , S
′′,1) = k2. From the expression
of piat (p1, S,1) in equation (8), we get
p′1S
′ +pi∗2H(S
′) = p′′1S
′′ +pi∗2H(S
′′) = k1 (13)
p′1S
′ +pi∗2L(S
′) = p′′1S
′′ +pi∗2L(S
′′) = k2 (14)
Subtracting equation (14) from equation (13), we get pi∗2H(S
′)−pi∗2L(S′) = pi∗2H(S′′)−pi∗2L(S′′). Since pi∗2H(S)−
pi∗2L(S) strictly decreases in S (Lemma D.1), we immediately have S
′ = S′′. This result, together with equation
(13) and the fact S′ > 0, further implies p′1 = p
′′
1 . This, however, contradicts with the assumption that (p
′
1, S
′)
and (p′′1 , S
′′) are two distinct points.
(ii) To show that the high type’s curve crosses the low type’s from below, we will prove that the high type’s
curve is below the low type’s on the left of the crossing point. The result for the other side of the crossing point
can be shown in a same way.
Suppose that the two curves cross at point (p′1, S
′) with S′ > 0 and that the high type’s curve is above the low
type’s on the left of the crossing point. Hence, there must exist two points (p′′1H , S
′′) and (p′′1L, S
′′) on the high
type’s and low type’s curves, respectively, such that 0< S′′ < S′ and p′′1H > p
′′
1L. By definition of the iso-profit
curve and equation (8), we have
p′1S
′ +pi∗2H(S
′) = p′′1HS
′′ +pi∗2H(S
′′) = k1 (15)
p′1S
′ +pi∗2L(S
′) = p′′1LS
′′ +pi∗2L(S
′′) = k2 (16)
Subtracting equation (16) from equation (15), we get (p′′1H − p′′1L)S′′ + pi∗2H(S′′)− pi∗2L(S′′) = pi∗2H(S′)− pi∗2L(S′).
Since p′′1H > p
′′
1L and S
′′ > 0, we have pi∗2H(S
′′)− pi∗2L(S′′) < pi∗2H(S′)− pi∗2L(S′). This, however, contradicts with
the fact S′′ <S′ and Lemma D.1.
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 3
(i) First note that by Theorem 1, SfL > 0 if and only if T > T1. Hence, it suffices to show that a separating
equilibrium exists if and only if SfL > 0.
(⇒) Prove by contradiction. Suppose SfL = 0 and a separating equilibrium exists. First note that equations (10)
and (11) jointly imply pi∗2H(S
a
H)−pi∗2L(SaH)≥ pi∗2H(SfL)−pi∗2L(SfL), which further implies SaH ≤ SfL by Lemma D.1.
Since SfL = 0 and S
a
H ≥ 0 (constraint (9)), we immediately have SaH = 0. In other words, both types of sellers
sell only in spot in the separating equilibrium. This, however, contradicts with the definition of a separating
equilibrium.
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(⇐) It suffices to show that when SfL > 0, there exists a solution for the high-quality seller’s problem (equations
(9) through (12)). To this end, define a function of S for S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)]:
M(S) = piaL(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)−piaL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
= p∗1H(S)S +pi
∗
2L(S)− [pf1LSfL +pi∗2L(SfL)].
Clearly M(S) is continuous in S. Also recall the following facts: pf1L = p
∗
1L(S
f
L), S
f
L maximizes pi
a
L (p
∗
1L(S), S,0),
and p∗1H(S)> p
∗
1L(S) (Lemma C.1). These facts imply the values of M(S) at two boundary points, 0 and S
f
L:
M(0) = pi∗2L(0)−piaL
(
p∗1L(S
f
L), S
f
L,0
)≤ 0
M(SfL) =
(
p∗1H(S
f
L)− pf1L
)
SfL =
(
p∗1H(S
f
L)− p∗1L(SfL)
)
SfL > 0 (17)
Hence, there exists a point S ∈ [0, SfL) satisfying M(S) = 0. Let S = min{S ∈ [0, SfL) :M(S) = 0}. Below we show
that (p∗1H(S), S) satisfies all the constraints in the high-type seller’s problem:
• Constraint (9): by definition of S, 0≤ S < SfL ≤min(T,N1). Also, when S > 0, clearly p1 = p∗1H(S) satisfies
p1 ∈ [p∗1L(S), p∗1H(S)].
• Constraint (10): by definition of S, piaL(p∗1H(S), S,1) = piaL(pf1L, SfL,0).
• Constraint (11): by Lemma D.1 and the fact S < SfL, piaH(p∗1H(S), S,1)− piaH(pf1L, SfL,0) > piaL(p∗1H(S), S,1)−
piaL(p
f
1L, S
f
L,0) = 0.
• Constraint (12): by definition of S, S <SfL. Hence, (p∗1H(S), S) 6= (pf1L, SfL).
(ii) First note that if L type sells in advance in the separating equilibrium (i.e., SaL > 0), then his advance
price must equal to p∗1L(S
a
L). That is because any price lower than p
∗
1L(S
a
L) is strictly dominated and any price
higher will not be accepted by advance customers, as L type is perfectly discerned in the separating equilibrium.
If, however, L type does not sell in advance (i.e., SaL = 0), his profit in equilibrium is simply pi
∗
2L(0). In both
cases, the low-type seller’s profit in the separating equilibrium is p∗1L(S
a
L)S
a
L + pi
∗
2L(S
a
L). Furthermore, since S
f
L
maximizes p∗1L(S)S +pi
∗
2L(S) for S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)] (ref. equation (7)), the highest profit that the low type can
make in the equilibrium is p∗1L(S
f
L)S
f
L +pi
∗
2L(S
f
L).
On the other hand, if L type follows his full-information strategy (p∗1L(S
f
L), S
f
L) and S
f
L > 0, customers will
always buy in advance regardless of their posterior belief b, because their maximum willingness-to-pay is at
least p∗1L(S
f
L) (ref equation (5)). Consequently, the lowest profit that the low type can guarantee to make in a
separating equilibrium is also p∗1L(S
f
L)S
f
L +pi
∗
2L(S
f
L).
From the two facts above, L type always follows his full-information strategy in a separating equilibrium, i.e.,
pa1L = p
∗
1L(S
f
L) = p
f
1L and S
a
L = S
f
L.
(iii) We first show the first half of (iii-c): if SaH > 0, p
a
1H = p
∗
1H(S
a
H), and then use it to prove the other results.
(iii-c) if SaH > 0, p
a
1H = p
∗
1H(S
a
H): Prove by contradiction. Suppose S
a
H > 0 and p
a
1H 6= p∗1H(SaH). By constraint (9),
we immediately have pa1H < p
∗
1H(S
a
H). To reach a contradiction, it suffices to show that, compared to (p
a
1H , S
a
H),
the feasible strategy (p∗1H(S), S) identified in part (i) strictly improves H type’s profit.
To this end, first note that by definition of S and the fact M(0) ≤ 0, we have M(S) ≤ 0 for all S ≤ S.
Meanwhile, since pa1H < p
∗
1H(S
a
H), constraint (10) must be binding with (p
a
1H , S
a
H), otherwise the high-quality
seller can strictly increase the total profit by slightly raising pa1H while fixing S
a
H . The binding constraint (10)
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and pa1H < p
∗
1H(S
a
H) jointly imply pi
a
L (p
∗
1H(S
a
H), S
a
H ,1)> pi
a
L (p
a
1H , S
a
H ,1) = pi
a
L
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
, i.e., M(SaH)> 0. All of
these results jointly imply SaH >S.
Next we prove that (p∗1H(S), S) dominates (p
a
1H , S
a
H). By definition of S, the binding constraint (10), Lemma
D.1, and the fact SaH >S, we have
piaH(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)−piaH (pa1H , SaH ,1)
= piaL (p
∗
1H(S), S,1)−pi∗2L(S) +pi∗2H(S)− [piaL (pa1H , SaH ,1)−pi∗2L (SaH) +pi∗2H (SaH)]
= piaL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)−pi∗2L(S) +pi∗2H(S)− [piaL (pf1L, SfL,0)−pi∗2L (SaH) +pi∗2H (SaH)]
= pi∗2H(S)−pi∗2L(S)− [pi∗2H (SaH)−pi∗2L (SaH)]> 0.
(iii-a) Prove by contradiction. Suppose SaH ≥ SaL. Since SaL = SfL by part (ii), we have SaH ≥ SfL. Meanwhile, as
shown in part (i), SaH ≤ SfL. These facts jointly imply SaH = SfL. Also note that in an equilibrium, SfL > 0 by
part (i). Hence, pa1H = p
∗
1H(S
a
H) = p
∗
1H(S
f
L) by part (iii-c). However, from equation (17), (p
∗
1H(S
f
L), S
f
L) violates
constraint (10) and hence cannot be H type’s equilibrium strategy.
(iii-b) Follows immediately from parts (ii) and (iii-a), as well as Theorem 2.
(iii-c) if SaH > 0, p
a
1H ≤ pf1H : pa1H = p∗1H(SaH) by part (iii-c) and pf1H = p∗1H(SfH) by definition of pf1H . The result
then follows from the facts that p∗1H(S) is nondecreasing in S and S
a
H <S
f
H (shown above).
(iii-d) By parts (iii-a) through (iii-c), the high type’s problem is equivalent to pa1H = p
∗
1H(S
a
H) if S
a
H > 0 and
SaH = arg max
S∈[0,Sf
H
)
piaH(p
∗
1H(S), S,1) = p
∗
1H(S)S +pi
∗
2H(S)
subject to: piaL(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)≤ piaL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
(18)
piaH(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)≥ piaH
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
(19)
Note that piat (p
∗
1t(S), S,1) = pi
f
t (S) for t=H or L. Based on the property of pi
f
t (S) characterized in Yu et al.
(2010), below we prove by considering three cases:
• T1 < T < N1 + N2: By Yu et al. (2010), both piaH(p∗1H(S), S,1) and piaL(p∗1L(S), S,1) strictly increase in
S ∈ [0, SfH). It is easy to show that (p∗1H(S)− p∗1L(S))S is nondecreasing in S, and hence piaL(p∗1H(S), S,1) =
piaL(p
∗
1L(S), S,1)+(p
∗
1H(S)−p∗1L(S))S strictly increases in S ∈ [0, SfH). As a result, constraint (18) must be bind-
ing when S = SaH . Fixing L and S, we have pi
a
L(p
∗
1H(S), S,1) strictly increases in H > L, while pi
a
L
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
remains constant. Hence, SaH is nonincreasing in H > L. (It is also easy to see S
a
H > 0, as the inequality in
constraint (18) is strict when S = 0. We will use this result in later proof.)
• T ≥N1 +N2 and L≥ t¯: By Yu et al. (2010), both piaH(p∗1H(S), S,1) and piaL(p∗1L(S), S,1) are independent of
S for S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)]. Meanwhile, since p∗1H(S) > p∗1L(S), constraint (18) is satisfied only when S = 0. It is
easy to show that S = 0 also satisfies constraint (19). Hence, SaH = 0 for all H >L.
• T ≥N1 +N2 and L< t¯: By Yu et al. (2010), piaL(p∗1L(S), S,1) strictly increases in S ∈ [0, SfH). If H < t¯, then
the same monotonicity applies to piaH(p
∗
1H(S), S,1). Following the same logic as in the first bullet, we can show
that SaH is nonincreasing in H >L (and S
a
H ∈ (0, SfH)). If, however, H ≥ t¯, then piaH(p∗1H(S), S,1) is independent
of S. Since piaL(p
∗
1H(S), S,1) strictly increases in S, there exists an interval [0, S¯] for some S¯ ∈ (0, SfH) such that
constraint (18) is binding at S = S¯ and the high type is indifferent in choosing any S ∈ [0, S¯]. Hence, SaH = S¯
as it leads to the lexicographically largest equilibrium, and it decreases in H >L since piaL(p
∗
1H(S), S,1) strictly
increases in H.
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Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose a pooling equilibrium exists in which both types of sellers offer advance selling at (pE1 , S
E). Per def-
inition, SE > 0 and customers’ posterior belief b(pE1 , S
E) is the same as the prior belief q. Furthermore, since
customers would buy in advance in the equilibrium (ref. participating equilibrium), we have pE1 ≤ qp∗1H(SE) +
(1− q)p∗1L(SE), further implying pE1 < p∗1H(SE) by Lemma C.1. To show that Intuitive Criterion always elimi-
nates such a pooling equilibrium, it suffices to show that there always exists a strategy pair (p′1, S
′) such that
the high-quality seller strictly prefers choosing (p′1, S
′) and being perceived as a high-quality seller than pooling
at (pE1 , S
E), while the low-quality seller has the opposite preference.
To this end, we first define two functions of S for S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)]:
DH(S) = pi
a
H(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)−piaH(pE1 , SE, q) = p∗1H(S)S +pi∗2H(S)− [pE1 SE +pi∗2H(SE)],
DL(S) = pi
a
L(p
∗
1H(S), S,1)−piaL(pE1 , SE, q) = p∗1H(S)S +pi∗2L(S)− [pE1 SE +pi∗2L(SE)].
S E0 S S ’
S
D H ( S )
D L ( S )
^
Figure 6 Illustration of DH(S) and DL(S)
Clearly, both DH(S) and DL(S) are continuous in S. Furthermore, note that DH(SE) = (p∗1H(S
E)−pE1 )SE > 0
since pE1 < p
∗
1H(S
E) and SE > 0, and that DH(0) ≤ 0 since otherwise the high-quality seller would strictly
prefer selling only in spot to advance selling with (pE1 , S
E). Hence, there exists at least a point S ∈ [0, SE)
satisfying DH(S) = 0. Let Sˆ = max{S : S ∈ [0, SE),DH(S) = 0}. Clearly, DH(S) > 0 for all S ∈ (S¯, SE]. Mean-
while, by Lemma D.1, for S < SE, DH(S)−DL(S) = pi∗2H(S)− pi∗2L(S)− (pi∗2H(SE)−pi∗2L(SE)) > 0, implying
DL(Sˆ)<DH(Sˆ) = 0. Since DL(S) is continuous in S, there must exist a S′ in the right neighborhood of Sˆ such
that DH(S′) > 0 and DL(S′) < 0. Let p′1 = p
∗
1H(S
′). Clearly, (p′1, S
′) satisfies piaH(p
′
1, S
′,1) > piaH(p
E
1 , S
E, q) and
piaL(p
′
1, S
′,1)<piaL(p
E
1 , S
E, q).
Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 5
By Theorem 4, only two classes of equilibria are possible: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium where
neither type sells in advance. Below we prove by considering the following four cases:
• i) T ≤ T1: By Theorem 3 (i), there does not exist a separating equilibrium. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, neither
type sells in advance under full information. Hence, under asymmetric information, neither type would deviate
from selling only in spot.
• ii) and iii) T ∈ (T1,N1 + N2): First note that neither type selling in advance cannot be sustained as an
equilibrium, since otherwise L type always has an incentive to deviate to sell in advance with his full-information
strategy. On the other hand, by Theorem 3 (i) to (ii-b), a separating equilibrium always exists with SaL = S
f
L
and SaH < S
a
L. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, both types strictly prefer advance selling to selling only in spot
under full-information setting. Thus, SaH = 0 is always dominated by some S
a
H > 0. Hence, by Theorem 1,
SaH ∈ (0,min(T,N1)) and if T ∈ (T1, TD), SaL ∈ (0,min(T,N1)) and if T ∈ [TD,N1 +N2), SaL = min(T,N1).
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• iv.a) T ≥N1 +N2 and L< t¯: Similar to the second bullet, only a separating equilibrium exists. By Theorems
1 and 3, SaL = min(T,N1) and the low type strictly prefers advance selling to selling only in spot. Meanwhile,
by the proof of Theorem 3 part (iii-d), SaH ∈ (0, SfH)⊂ (0,min(T,N1)).
• iv.b) T ≥N1 +N2 and L≥ t¯: As shown in the proof of Theorem 3 part (iii-d), SaH = 0. Meanwhile, by Theorem
1, the low type is indifferent between (full or limited) advance selling and selling only in spot. Hence, both kinds
of equilibria can be sustained: either a separating equilibrium where H type sells only in spot and L type offers
(full or limited) advance selling, or a pooling equilibrium where neither type sells in advance.
Appendix H: Proof of Theorem 6
The proof uses the following three lemmas, where Lemma H.1 shows the seller’s optimal no-rationing strategy in
the full-information case, Lemmas H.2 and H.3 characterize the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium
for the no-rationing model, respectively.
Lemma H.1 When capacity rationing is not allowed and customers in advance are perfectly informed of quality,
there exists a function tD(T ) for T > 0 such that if t ≤ tD(T ), the seller should offer full advance selling;
otherwise, the seller should sell only in spot.
Lemma H.2 When capacity rationing is not allowed, in any separating equilibrium, L type offers full advance
selling at price pL1 (min(T,N1)), while H type sells only in spot.
Lemma H.3 (i) In the focal pooling equilibrium where both types of sellers sell in advance, the equilibrium
price is pE1 = qp
∗
1H(min(T,N1)) + (1− q)p∗1L(min(T,N1)). (ii) The focal pooling equilibrium is sustained only if
H ≤ tD(T ). (iii) When H ≤ tD(T ), there exist a threshold δ¯ ≥ 0 and a function q¯(δ) ∈ [0,1] for δ > 0 such that
the focal pooling equilibrium is sustained if either δ≤ δ¯ or q≥ q¯(δ).
The proof of Theorem 6 is naturally divided into the following three cases:
• L > tD(T ): By Lemma H.1, neither type sells in advance under full information. Hence, under asymmetric
information, neither type would deviate from selling only in spot.
• L≤ tD(T )<H: By Lemma H.1, only L type sells in advance under full information. Hence, under asymmetric
information, H type does not have incentive to sell in advance, as the maximum profit he can get from selling
in advance is pifH(min(T,N1)), which does not exceed pi
f
H(0) by Lemma H.1. Similarly, L type does not have an
incentive to sell only in spot, as pifL(min(T,N1))≥ pifL(0) by Lemma H.1.
• H ≤ tD(T ): By Lemma H.1, both types sell in advance under full information. Under asymmetric information,
both types selling in advance occurs only in a pooling equilibrium (by Lemma H.2) and the focal pooling
equilibrium is sustained if either δ≤ δ or q≥ q(δ) (by Lemma H.3). If, however, δ > δ and q < q(δ), pooling with
L type in advance makes H type worse off compared to selling only in spot. Meanwhile, L type would rather
sell in advance alone than selling only in spot (by Lemma H.1). Hence, a separating equilibrium is sustained.
Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 7
We follow three steps to prove the result: (i-a) positive advertising expenditure can be sustained only in a
separating equilibrium where both types sell in advance and only high type advertises; (i-b) the separating
equilibrium in point (i-a) is sustained if and only if L < H ≤ tD(T ) and δ ≤ δ; (ii) whenever the separating
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equilibrium in point (i-a) is sustained, it is pareto dominated by a focal pooling equilibrium where both types
sell in advance and neither advertises.
(i-a) First, similarly to the proof of Lemma H.2, it can be shown that no separating equilibrium exists where
only high type sells in advance. Likewise, no separating equilibrium exists where both types sell in advance and
advertise, or only low type does so. In either case, the low type would be better off deviating to no advertising at
all, since advertising can neither increase sales nor improve margin for her. Furthermore, any pooling equilibrium
where both types sell and advertise in advance is pareto dominated by the focal pooling equilibrium where both
sell in advance and yet neither advertises. Thus, the only possible scenario to sustain a positive advertising
spending is a separating equilibrium where both types offer advance selling and yet only high type advertises.
(i-b) A separating equilibrium where both types sell in advance and only high type advertises exists if and only
if there exists some A> 0 satisfying the following four conditions:
p∗1H(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2H(min(T,N1))−A≥ pi∗2H(0)
p∗1L(min(T,N1))min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2L(min(T,N1))≥ pi∗2L(0)
p∗1H(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2L(min(T,N1))−A≤ p∗1L(min(T,N1))min(T,N1) +pi∗2L(min(T,N1))
p∗1H(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2H(min(T,N1))−A≥ p∗1L(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) +pi∗2H(min(T,N1))
where the first two inequalities ensure that both types prefer selling in advance to selling only in spot, and the
last two inequalities guarantee that neither type has an incentive to mimic the other type. After simplifying,
these conditions are equivalent to
p∗1H(min(T,N1))min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2H(min(T,N1))−pi∗2H(0)≥A= [p∗1H(min(T,N1))− p∗1L(min(T,N1))] min(T,N1)
p∗1L(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) +pi
∗
2L(min(T,N1))≥ pi∗2L(0)
By the proof of Lemma H.3, these conditions are satisfied if and only if H ≤ tD(T ) and δ≤ δ.
(ii) From the equilibrium conditions in point (i-b), it is easy to see that the type-t seller’s profit in the separating
equilibrium equals to p∗1L(min(T,N1)) min(T,N1) + pi
∗
2t(min(T,N1)). However, when H ≤ tD(T ) and δ ≤ δ, by
Lemma H.3, a no-advertising pooling equilibrium also exists, where the type-t seller’s equilibrium profit equals
to pE1 min(T,N1)+pi
∗
2t(min(T,N1)). Since p
E
1 ≥ p∗1L(min(T,N1)), the separating equilibrium is pareto dominated
by the pooling equilibrium.
Appendix J: Proof of Theorem 8
First note that L type never invests in advertising in any separating equilibrium, where he always follows his
full-information strategy. Denote H type’s equilibrium strategy by (p∗1, S
∗,A∗). Per definition of a separating
equilibrium, (p∗1, S
∗,A∗) is a solution to the following problem:
max
p1,S,Q
pia,ADH (p1, S,Q,1) = p1S +pi
∗
2H(S)−Q
subject to S = 0 or S ∈ (0,min(T,N1)] and p1 ∈ [p∗1L(S), p∗1H(S)],Q≥ 0 (20)
pia,ADL (p1, S,Q,1)≤ pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
(21)
pia,ADH (p1, S,Q,1)≥ pia,ADH
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
(22)
(p1, S,Q) 6=
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0
)
(23)
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We prove A∗ = 0 by contradiction. Suppose A∗ > 0. To reach a contradiction, it suffices to show that there
exists a feasible strategy (p′1, S
′,0) which strictly improves H type’s profit from what he can get by following
strategy (p∗1, S
∗,A∗).
To this end, first note that when A∗ > 0, H type should sell in advance in equilibrium (i.e., S∗ > 0), since
otherwise he could not enjoy any benefit from the advertising. Meanwhile, constraint (21) must hold as equality
at (p∗1, S
∗,A∗), since otherwise A∗ can be decreased by a small amount such that all the constraints are satisfied
and H type’s total profit is strictly improved. That is,
pia,ADL (p
∗
1, S
∗,A∗,1) = pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
. (24)
Subtracting equation (24) from equation (22), we get
pia,ADH (p
∗
1, S
∗,A∗,1)−pia,ADL (p∗1, S∗,A∗,1)≥ pia,ADH
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)−pia,ADL (pf1L, SfL,0,0) ,
which further implies,
pi∗2H(S
∗)−pi∗2L(S∗)≥ pi∗2H(SfL)−pi∗2L(SfL) (25)
By Lemma D.1, equation (25) implies SfL ≥ S∗ > 0.
Now, define a function of S for S ∈ [0,min(T,N1)]: M(S) = pia,ADL (p∗1H(S), S,0,1) − pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
.
Clearly M(S) is continuous in S. Furthermore, M(0)≤ 0 since (pf1L, SfL,0) is L type’s full-information strategy.
Meanwhile, by equations (20) and (24),
M(S∗) = pia,ADL (p
∗
1H(S
∗), S∗,0,1)−pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
≥ pia,ADL (p∗1, S∗,0,1)−pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
= pia,ADL (p
∗
1, S
∗,A∗,1) +A∗−pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
) =A∗ > 0
Hence, there exists a S′ ∈ [0, S∗) such that M(S′) = 0. That is,
pia,ADL (p
∗
1H(S
′), S′,0,1) = pia,ADL
(
pf1L, S
f
L,0,0
)
= pia,ADL (p
∗
1, S
∗,A∗,1) (26)
Since S′ <S∗ ≤ SfL, it is easy to check that (p∗1H(S′), S′,0) satisfies all constraints. Furthermore, noting S′ <S∗,
by equation (26) and Lemma D.1, we have
pia,ADH (p
∗
1H(S
′), S′,0,1)−pia,ADH (p∗1, S∗,A∗,1)
= pia,ADL (p
∗
1H(S
′), S′,0,1) +pi∗2H(S
′)−pi∗2L(S′)−
[
pia,ADL (p
∗
1, S
∗,A∗,1) +pi∗2H(S
∗)−pi∗2L(S∗)
]
= pi∗2H(S
′)−pi∗2L(S′)− [pi∗2H(S∗)−pi∗2L(S∗)]> 0
That is, compared to (p∗1, S
∗,A∗), (p∗1H(S
′), S′,0) strictly improves H type’s profit. This is a contradiction with
the optimality of (p∗1, S
∗,A∗). Hence, A∗ = 0.
